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Book Reviews

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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"Unpleasant Work for a Naval Man"
Mine Countermeasures

Lieutenant Commander Jan van Tol, U.S. Navy

Melia, Tamara M. *Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1775-1991.* Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991. 209pp. (No price given)

MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM) is a sport that Americans have historically seemed unsuited for by temperament. MCM is slow, uncertain, infinitely tedious—precisely the opposite of the dramatic, definitive nature of other types of operations that more easily engage the professional interests of most U.S. naval officers. What combatant officer (this reviewer included) following a plodding little minesweeper out of harbor at the beginning of a fleet exercise has not fervently wished that the poor old thing would just get out of the way and let the real ships get on with the important evolutions that lay ahead? And yet, failure to recognize the importance of MCM maintaining a modern capability has regularly embarrassed the Navy, most recently in the Persian Gulf between 1987 and 1991.

Damn the Torpedoes is a short, well researched monograph on the U.S. Navy's experience with MCM. Based on scores of interviews with MCM personnel as well as on copious archival material, the book discusses MCM efforts from the Civil War through the recent Persian Gulf operations. The historical record thus revealed shows a dismayingly consistent pattern of early losses, *ad hoc* adaptation, repentance and good intentions, and finally relapse into complacence at the end of hostilities.

Senior American naval authorities have routinely paid lip service to the importance of MCM, usually after painful reminders. And yet, the author suggests, MCM is not and never was quite important enough to them to get the needed resources, despite the fact that "the recent experiences of the *Samuel B. Roberts*, *Tripoli*, and *Princeton* remind us that even our most valuable and expensive warships can be easily stopped by simple, cheap mines." Why should this be so? Perhaps the key reason is that the business of countering mines, to use a felicitous phrase, has always been a "danger field," in that it gets no respect. The widespread view that "minesweeping is tedious, minehunting is more tedious, and countering mines cannot be made easy, cheap, or convenient," makes MCM organizationally and professionally unattractive. Responsibility for mine warfare has usually been fragmented, with the result that MCM is a low-priority claimant for funding or for high-level interest (though the recent establishment of COMINEWARCOM as a type commander may finally ameliorate this to an extent). Professionally, MCM and mine warfare have been paths to neither glory nor promotion; more typically, they have been considered "unpleasant work for a naval man, an occupation like that of rat-catching."

Will matters be different in the future? The author pessimistically notes that "due to real competing needs, priorities, and lack of mine warfare knowledge within the Navy, it has been impossible to sustain adequate priority and funding for MCM." Today's budgetary constraints may make competing needs and priorities hard to change. However, the professional ignorance of most officers about MCM can certainly be redressed.

A good start would be to make *Damn the Torpedoes* required reading for naval officers, particularly for surface officers and members of operational staffs. If appreciation for MCM and its difficulty does not become more widespread, the Navy is likely to encounter more embarrassments and losses to mines in future operations. It will never be known what might have happened if an amphibious landing had actually been attempted in Kuwait, but Iraqi mining certainly complicated the planning. Future foes will doubtless take note.

Massie, Robert K. *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War.* New York: Random House, 1991. 1007pp. $35

This is a history centred around personalities. Robert Massie has employed his considerable and tireless narrative skills to give the reader a thousand pages that detail the complex relationships of the political, military, and diplomatic elites of Great Britain and Germany in the decades leading to the Great War. In this, Massie has written in the tradition of such works as Cecil Woodham Smith's biography of Queen Victoria in creating a compelling picture of life within the ruling classes.

There is, however, one difficulty. Much of the tragedy of 1914-1918 can clearly be explained through consideration of the posturings of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the ambitions of Tirpitz, and the enthusiasms of Fisher and Churchill. But Massie's concentration on Anglo-German issues oversimplifies the question of origin of the war to absurdity and ignores the fact that the heat had gone out of the rivalry by 1914. The conflict began as an Austro-Serbian dispute and then went on to other things; the involvement of Britain was by no means simple, or even inevitable until the point at which Germany violated Belgain neutrality.

Other criticisms could be mentioned regarding Massie's lack of a wider political and economic context, but in this naval journal it is fair to concentrate only upon Massie's attempts to cover the naval issues. They are gravely flawed. First, the author has made no use of modern scholarship and its more balanced view of the Victorian and Edwardian navies, and second, he has employed the arguments of witnesses who have never been known for their objectivity.

That Massie's mastery of naval matters might be less than complete is evidenced by the multitude of errors and solecisms apparent in his first few pages on the Trafalgar campaign in 1805. He ignores the fact that Nelson had chased Villeneuve to the West Indies, calls Trafalgar a bay (it is a cape), confers on Collingwood a title (with incorrect usage) which he did not possess until after the battle, and employs lurid tabloid prose to describe *Victory*'s encounter with *Redoubtable*. These pages stand in defiance of C.S. Forester's example that sailing warfare can be described in terms which are not only vivid and gripping for the contemporary reader but seamanlike—and historically correct.

The errors continue—Massie's misinterpretation of the Admiralty's reaction to the French *La Gloire*, the armoured ship produced in 1858. By taking the launch of the wooden *Victoria* out of context (this may have taken place in 1859 but the ship was on the stocks long before *La Gloire*'s nature was known), Massie launches himself upon a thesis of naval inertia and conservatism which minimises the real problems of technical uncertainty that the Royal Navy (and *all* other navies) had to face between 1860 and 1914. It also minimises the quality of the response. Close inspection of his references demonstrates that Massie's authorities are limited. He makes extensive use of the letters of Lord Fisher, who was never known for moderation or strict attention to the truth in his writings and who was in so many ways the contemporary epitome of the dictum, "the devil quotes scripture to suit his ends."

Massie's other sources are little better. Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon left the active Royal Navy in the wake of a scandal resulting from his too assiduous support for Fisher and his unscrupulous methods. Admiral Sir Percy Scott, the gunnery reformer, was another zealot whose obduracy and lack of perspective might have achieved much but

brought him grief and wasted effort, therefore making him an unreliable historical witness. Massie's fourth reference is Vice Admiral Kenneth Dewar, one of the "Young Turks" of the pre-1914 era. He was embittered by his involvement in the *Royal Oak* affair of 1928 in which his inability as a battleship captain to serve with a choleric flag officer resulted in his court martial and that of his executive officer and the blasting of the careers of all unfortunate enough to be involved.

Massie has employed Arthur Marder's works *The Anatomy of British Seapower* and *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* but has failed to consult more recent scholarship (particularly Jon Sumida's *In Defense of Naval Supremacy*) to achieve a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the development of the dreadnought battleship and the battle cruiser and of their role in British defence and financial policy. He deploys partly understood snippets of technical knowledge which are often out of context and sometimes factually incorrect.

The pity of this book is that it represents an unnecessary example of the equally unnecessary but seemingly ever-wider gap that exists between "popular" and "academic" history. A writer of Robert Massie's quality has the opportunity to present a synthesis of historical knowledge to a wide public audience and to act thereby as the popular interpreter of the specialist historians. In confining himself so largely to works twenty or more years old, Robert Massie has missed the opportunity. *Dreadnought* is compelling to read but it is not good history.

JAMES GOLDRICK
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German, Tony. *The Sea Is at Our Gates*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990. 360pp. C$24.95

"The wholesome sea is at her gates—her gates both east and west," is the legend carved above the entrance to the Canadian parliament buildings, and the title of a popular history of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Both the promotional material and the author's prologue for this book suggest the promise of an authoritative work that will complete the deficient operational historiography of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). It is however, a promise unfulfilled. Instead, we have a breathless, almost journalistic account of the Canadian navy.

Commander Tony German is the son of one of the first group of officers to train for the Royal Canadian Navy. His father commanded ships during World War II through the post-war naval heyday. The author's personal view of the events which shaped Canada's maritime forces is a deeply sentimental story.

German has attempted to right the perceived wrong that Canada's tremendous efforts during World War II, Korea, and at the height of the Cold War have largely gone unrecognized. He has accomplished this in his description of the Canadian operations during the Cuban missile crisis, when the

RCN was at its peak. But non-Canadians may find the narrative a bit parochial and self-serving.

Although historically accurate, German's account of the Canadian escort operations from World War II through the mid-1960s is a simplistic tale of daring seamen, bungling staff, cool naval professionals, dithering politicians, heroes, and villains. His personal knowledge of ships, men, and places does make a riveting tale of action about the desperate battles against U-boats around the slow Atlantic convoys, and the high-speed actions of Canada's destroyers and motorboats off the French and Norwegian coasts. However, his black-and-white approach flies in the face of the grey areas, which makes many of German's interpretations engaging but not very believable.

German's discussion of the RCN's operations to relieve U.S. naval forces on patrols in approaches to the eastern seaboard during the Cuban missile crisis is one of materiel readiness and professional competence that is bound to make any Canadian sailor proud, but again he is emotional and superficial when describing the Canadian government's reaction to the rising crisis. Early in the crisis Canada's prime minister, along with other senior members of government, were opposed to the actions of the Kennedy administration and attempted to defuse the situation through the use of the United Nations. German dismisses U.S. behavior as hesitant, dithering, and vacillating, and supports the view held at that time by Canadian flag officers that they should carry on with whatever could be done despite the politicians. There is no doubt that a high degree of loyalty and skill was demonstrated by the seagoing members of the RCN, but their leaders had clearly failed to maintain their subordination to the legitimate civil authority. The author's endorsement of their professional arrogance is disturbing in this otherwise fascinating inside view of a little-known Canadian naval operation.

There are a number of factual errors that appear early on in the work and in the final chapters of the book. German's estimate of events leading up to World War II is a jumble of details and generalities that can be left unread and without detracting from the flow of the story. On the other hand, the latter part of the work, which covers the unification of Canada's armed forces and the decline of the navy, is fascinating reading not available elsewhere.

Those seeking an authoritative history of the Canadian navy will have to wait. *The Sea Is at Our Gates* should not be considered a serious academic contribution; it lacks footnotes, and political and alliance context, not to mention a balanced analysis. However, neither should it be dismissed. It is a fast-paced, effectively written "view from the bridge" that captures the flavour of Canada's on-again off-again relationship with the wholesome sea at her gates.

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Lamb, Richard. *The Drift to War, 1922-1939.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 372pp. $24.95

This historical work, originally published in 1989, consists of previously unpublished material and expands the revisionist study of the origins of World War II. While Lamb details the diplomatic, social, economic, and military events which culminated in a world at war, he also provides new historical explanations for its cause. He offers a new and sobering look at how politicians, military leaders, and the public at large failed to pursue peace and drove the world to war.

Richard Lamb is a journalist, historian, and BBC radio commentator who has combined all three talents into his latest work. Although the reader knows how the book ends, Lamb has managed to spin his tale like a suspense novel; each chapter is filled with many opportunites to avert world war.

Of the books two sections, the first discusses 1922-1933, before Hitler came to power. A culmination of mistakes, poor policy decisions, and untimely personnel changes in various governments slowly forced Germany to the point where its democratic government lost the faith of its people. Through the vindictiveness and shortsightedness of several governments, Germany's economic situation demanded a change in the state's governing party. This resulted in the increase in power of the Nazis.

The second section examines the successes and failures of French and British diplomacy when dealing with the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany. Their former hardline approach to Germany was replaced by appeasement and conciliation. Numerous opportunities to prevent Hitler's political and military aggression were missed due to overinflated egos, gross political misunderstandings, and personal biases. The actions of those few individuals responsible for the tragic results are no more palatable now than they were fifty years ago.

The American reader may have trouble with the syntax and acronyms, plus the many typographical errors, but the lessons Lamb offers on politics and diplomacy make these distractions minor.

All serious students of World War II will benefit from this detailed and enlightening work.

GARY TROGDEN
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Mrazek, James E. *The Fall of Eben Emael.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1991. 192pp. $19.95

Belgian fortresses have played an interesting but ultimately treacherous role in the opening moves of both world wars. In 1914 and 1940, Joffre and Gamelin respectively were lulled into the belief that the strength of Belgian fortresses at Liege or along the Albert Canal would buy them enough time to put their plans into action. In both cases, these key positions proved remarkably easy to seize.

First published in 1970, this work provides a thorough account of the fall of Eben Emael, a fortress designed to delay indefinitely any German encroachment into the Low Countries. But the multimillion-franc fortification, garrisoned by several hundred men, fell in barely one day to seventy-eight German paratroopers.

Colonel Mrazek's tactical account of the seizure of Eben Emael is generally successful, despite occasional attempts to establish atmosphere by creating dialogue and conjuring up casts of heel-clicking German subalterns. He describes how the development of glider assault techniques and the shaped charge allowed a handful of German paratroopers to seize the extensive surface of the fortification and destroy the cupolas and casemates whose artillery was meant to delay the German advance. Because the Belgians had failed to provide any infantry cover for a fortress they regarded merely as an artillery platform, the Germans had little difficulty in driving underground those artillerymen who attempted—rather half-heartedly it appears—to reach the top. Unfortunately, Mrazek never explains satisfactorily why the Belgians came to this decision about the defense of the position, especially given the experiences of World War I, when forts such as Douamont were defended primarily from trenches on the outside. This rather makes nonsense of the author's very 1960s explanation that soldiers always fight the last war. It would also have been interesting to learn how Eben Emael's defense measured up to that of the Maginot Line, both in fact and in doctrine.

Mrazek is less successful in his attempt to divine the broader significance of the event he describes. Having invested so much time in his narration of the fall of Eben Emael, he succumbs to the temptation of interpreting its demise as an event of immense strategic importance. Historians and strategists will no doubt be astonished at the author's assertion that the *coup* at Eben Emael offers irrefutable proof of "Hitler's military genius" (indeed, this is the title of his concluding chapter). According to the author, news of the collapse of a fortification which was "virtually holy ground" ended any hope by the Belgian army for a "meaningful riposte," shattered the political will of the Belgian government to continue the war, and meant that "the road to the Channel was clear and the British escape through Dunkirk an unavoidable consequence."

While one may argue that the collapse of the Liege fortresses in 1914 really was significant, for it allowed the Schlieffen Plan to operate, the German attack in northern Belgium in May 1940 was never more than a successful feint. If the British ultimately fled to Dunkirk, with the Belgians and French close on their heels, it was because the Germans cracked the front at Sedan, not Eben Emael. The major strategic significance of Eben Emael occurred before war broke out: for its existance helped to convince Gamelin that his Dyle-Breda Plan would work if his troops could reach

prepared defensive positions on the Albert Canal, and thus blinded him to the real German intentions.

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Weintraub, Stanley. *Long Day's Journey into War: December 7, 1941.* New York: Turman Talley-Dutton, 1991. 706pp. $26.95

For *anyone* interested in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the official U.S. entry into World War II, especially those who think they have read everything of importance on the subject, this book is essential reading.

Stanley Weintraub, a Penn State cultural historian and author of works on World War I, the Spanish Civil War, and Korea, has fleshed out minute details of that epic day that are not only fascinating as vignettes but often prove to be insights into the broader reasons for, and implications of, the global events (on both sides of the Date Line) on that forty-eight hour day.

Bracketed by chapters on "The Day Before" (actually weeks) and "The Day After," the body of this fast-paced narrative is arranged by chapters for each of those forty-eight hours; each chapter is illustrated with clocks that give the different time zones for the hour under discussion. Therefore, Weintraub jumps between Washington, Hawaii, London, Leningrad, Tobruk, Port Moresby, northern Malaya, Hong Kong, Vladivostok, Addis Ababa, Manila, German death camps, ships at sea, and the atomic bomb scientists. As the pace quickens the chapters lengthen, until the monumental Hour 30 (7:30 A.M. Hawaiian time) and the hours thereafter.

The overriding message of this work is the shock of recognition by an entire generation of the dramatic change wrought by the attack. In fact, individual reactions to the news constitute a great deal of the book, and though each experience is fresh, on the whole they are almost wearisome. Weintraub has provided charts and photos to enhance the stories.

What troubles the scholarly reader is the complete absence of a bibliography of secondary sources. The author does list his own research, but states that a list of the books he used would have been prohibitively long. Fair enough, but few readers will have a grasp of the vast literature he consulted. And one must question the accuracy of some quoted conversations.

Weintraub effectively disproves conspiracy theories, but does reveal tantalizing warnings of war that are new to this reviewer: Ambassador John Winant's in London, Admiral W.A. Glassford's with the Asiatic Fleet, British Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder's in Egypt, and also the Japanese businesses in the Dutch East Indies that closed for extended vacation days prior to the attack. The author convincingly devastates U.S. peacetime officers for their inept preparations: Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Intelligence; General Walter C. Short, commanding U.S. Army forces

in Hawaii; CincPac Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who "symbolized command inertia"; and especially Generals Douglas MacArthur and Lewis Brereton, commanding Army and Army Air Corps forces respectively in the Philippines. MacArthur, guilty of receiving political payoffs from Filipino leaders, had however become "an icon" untouchable by even President Franklin Roosevelt, whereas "Kimmel and Short were expendable," "faceless military technocrats who had lapsed in vigilance."

Details of the day attest to the author's tireless research: the origin of the word "boondocks," the bombastic hollow rhetoric of Congressman Lyndon B. Johnson, the British PBY seaplane shot down over the Japanese Indonesian invasion convoy on 6 December 1941 and never reported to London or Washington, the Spanish Blue Division fighting before Leningrad, the Dutch merchantman blazing away at Japanese bombers over Pearl Harbor, the abrupt collapse of the American First movement, the Japanese servants conscientiously sharing confinement with diplomats at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo for six months partly to atone for their own country's "bad things," and the ditched Japanese pilot on Hawaiian Niihau killing and being killed by the Japanese-descended *nisei*.

Weintraub's postscript on Hiroshima is a fitting finale to his grand account: Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who had led the attack on Pearl Harbor, on recovering Professor Luis Alvarez's parachuted cylinder which had measured the performance of the first atomic bomb, remarked, "Whatever made us think we could beat America?"

CLARK G. REYNOLDS
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Tillman, Barrett. *Wildcat: The F4F in World War II.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990. 187pp. (No price given)

Books about famous World War II aircraft are in vogue, but too many of them are hastily repackaged material from earlier works. Fortunately, this work is of a better class and superbly documents the development and operational employment of the Wildcat in the United States and British navies.

Although by present standards the F4F fighter looks quaint, its performance no better than the T-28 trainers in which many current naval aviators began their flying careers, the F4F was a state-of-the-art fighter in its time. Thanks to *Wildcat*, readers now can appreciate the giant step forward that this early Grumman product represented and the invaluable service it rendered during World War II, especially during the critical first two years of the war.

Making a conscious choice to concentrate on the operational employment of the F4F rather than the technical differences between models, Tillman succeeds in writing a readable and complete account of the Wildcat's operational career, which began shortly before U.S. entry into the war

and ended in 1945. As the author notes, the F4F "represented as important an advancement in technology as the transition to jet propulsion ten years later." Another valid lesson that is well documented by the author is the importance of developing tactics suitable to the weapon in hand. The F4F's principle adversary was the A6M "Zero" fighter, which was faster, had a longer range, and could out-climb and out-turn it. In addition, most historians would agree that the Japanese pilots at the start of the war were as good as any in the world and more experienced than U.S. pilots.

Tillman skillfully chronicles the evolution of tactics, by masters like Jimmy Thatch, which enabled the Wildcat to overcome these disadvantages and achieve an impressive overall kill ratio of better than two to one. Ironically, the additional weight of the modifications (self-sealing fuel tanks, armor, and additional guns), which detracted from the F4F's performance also contributed to its enviable ability to absorb punishment and still return the pilot home—the genesis of Grumman's "Iron Works" reputation.

Many American readers are aware that the Wildcat served in the British Royal Navy, but Tillman brings to light the enviable operational record of the British Wildcats and Marlets (an earlier British name for their F4F's), which served the Royal Navy from the Battle of the Atlantic through the Mediterranean and Northern European theaters and into the Indian Ocean.

This second edition contains excellent photographs of various Wildcat variants in U.S. and British service, and extensive appendices. Despite the minor, but annoying, inclusion of Army P-39 and P-40 fighters in the chapter "Other American Naval Aircraft" (the *only* errors I discovered in the book), these appendices will be particularly useful to those unfamiliar with the World War II aircraft and squadron names and designations, and also provide a list of Wildcat "aces."

This work is a skillful mixture of personal accounts and official histories. Aviation historian Barrett Tillman conducted extensive interviews with the "who's who" of former F4F pilots to produce this informative and entertaining book, which belongs on any aviation library's bookshelf.

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Mendenhall, Corwin. *The Silent Stalking of Japan: Submarine Diary.* Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books, 1991. 290pp. $19.95

This is an excellent examination of the submarine campaign against Japan during World War II, through what appears to be contemporaneously documented observations of the author's eleven war patrols on two submarines. The urgency of the time is emphasized by the fact that Mendenhall made his first war patrol as an unqualified ensign and his last as a

lieutenant commander, executive officer, and a prospective commanding officer.

However, the real reason why students of modern warfare should give this work more than a superficial glance is its insight into how the perceived capabilities of maritime stealth rose to approach the intrinsic capabilities of the platform and its technology, and how doctrine, tactics, and procedures evolved to provide a better "impedance match" with the weapon system.

For example, in 1942 submarine commanding officers would not operate on station in waters less than one hundred fathoms (600 feet) deep to avoid detection by aircraft. They remained submerged at seventy-five percent of test depth with bare steerageway from an hour before sunrise to an hour after sunset. The presence of a single aircraft or escort ship would suffice to abort an attack, and island anchorage entrances were "blockaded" by patrolling as much as forty miles to seaward. The tactical nature of the submarine was stressed by a first-priority emphasis on warships as targets. By 1945, offensive operations were conducted in as little as fifteen fathoms, and daylight surfaced operations were commonplace—boats submerging only for attack or for brief periods of thirty minutes or so if an aircraft seemed to be approaching them. (Entries read "the Skipper noted through the periscope that the nearest destroyer was passing about seventy-five yards to starboard," as a protective screen was penetrated to attack a shipping convoy. Even bays and rivers were not immune to intrusion and inspection by target-hungry subs, and it had become apparent that the proper target set of the the submarine force was *strategic* in nature—warships were second priority to tankers and cargo ships.

The serious student will be interested in the mental exercises stimulated by *Submarine Diary*:

- What errors of fleet exercises, simulation, or gaming in the 1920s and 1930s led the Navy to advise submariners that it was suicidal to operate within four hundred miles of an enemy airbase, and that any daylight attack must be made from great depths using only sonar bearings?
- Are we again mistakenly assuming the attack submarine's mission set in the post-Soviet era to be tactical in nature and missing the *strategic* contribution provided by the early arrival on any littoral scene, anywhere in the world, of a survivable and ubiquitous weapon system with a broad spectrum of capabilities effective against valued assets both ashore and afloat?
- Do all the historical and contemporaneous under-estimations of the impact of maritime stealth have relevance to other forms of emergent stealth platforms such as the F-117, B-2, and ATF?

There are those who may take offense to Rear Admiral Mendenhall's blunt criticism of some senior officers' actions, decisions, and personal traits. In the author's defense, however, the great majority of his adverse comments

occur at the point in the text where he is an experienced executive officer and a prospective commanding officer. It would be a mediocre, poorly trained, and less than confident executive officer who did not question even the best of the commanding officers. No other alternative is acceptable. The system is designed to work that way.

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Kahn, David. *Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939-1943.* New York, N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991. 336pp. $22.95

In 1974 the historical community first learned of the group of dedicated scientists in World War II who had deciphered German Enigma communications under the Allied project known as Ultra. Prior histories of the war made no mention of Ultra or its significant contribution to the Allied victory. Unlike other authors who have attempted to evaluate the entire project, David Kahn has chosen to examine only one aspect of it—breaking the U-boat Enigma codes. This work describes how the men and women assigned to that task succeeded, and how their efforts effected the outcome of the war.

Kahn has done an admirable job of presenting the codebreakers' stories through a series of well documented events masterfully connected to create a dramatic tale that is enjoyable to read. He has also provided an excellent analysis of the value of Ultra intelligence not only in the Battle of the Atlantic but the entire war.

This work chronicles the events surrounding the development of the Enigma machine in the 1920s, how the Polish and French contributions helped to solve its mysteries in the 1930s, and the British acquisition of a working model in 1939. Kahn presents in detail the progress of the British codebreaking effort between 1939 and 1943, against the larger backdrop of the Battle of the Atlantic. North Atlantic convoys supplied the British war effort, and the German *Kriegsmarine* strategy was to guide the U-boat wolfpacks by radio communication to intercept them. It was therefore extremely important that the German communications be deciphered.

This history discusses the experiences of a few key personalities in fascinating detail, covering their codebreaking techniques and their dependence on captured documents, insightful guesses, and in many instances on mistakes made by the enemy. In addition the author has provided the German perspective of crucial events, which offers the reader viewpoints of both sides.

Kahn offers a convincing estimate of the possible extension of the war had the German Enigma codes not been deciphered, and how other factors such as the atomic bomb might have influenced events. He also provides an interesting discussion of why the Allies were more successful in codebreaking than the Germans, and

why the German leadership was unable to recognize the loss of integrity of their codes.

Though the book is well documented, at times Kahn digresses, often leading the reader away from the significance of the event under discussion; also, there are several detailed and often complex explanations, that can be daunting and incomprehensible, of the technology employed by the codebreakers.

While *Seizing the Enigma* is not the last word on Ultra, both scholar and history buff should not overlook this interesting addition to the literature.

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Hall, R. Cargill, ed. *Lightning over Bougainville: The Yamamoto Mission Reconsidered.* Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. 220pp. $21.95

"Despite denials by the Bush administration," claimed the recent *U.S. News & World Report* press release, "Saddam was targeted to be killed at the end of the Gulf War." Perhaps this is an apt moment for a new look at what has been called the "Y-Mission": the purposeful interception and destruction, on the basis of cryptanalysis, of an aircraft carrying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto over the island of Bougainville on 18 April 1943.

This work is primarily a record, with supporting documents, of the "Yamamoto Mission Retrospective" symposium held in April 1988 at the Admiral Nimitz Museum in Fredericksburg, Texas. That conference assembled a number of scholars and nearly all the surviving aviators involved, American and Japanese—for the first and doubtless the last time—in order to address "the military, political, ethical, and historical issues of that famous wartime operation."

A verbatim transcript of the proceedings (including a 1985 lecture by pilot Thomas G. Lanphier, who died in 1987) constitutes about one-third of the book. The remainder comprises Mr. Hall's biographical sketch of Admiral Yamamoto and review of the Guadalcanal campaign leading up to the attack, separate interviews of two surviving Japanese aviators involved (a Zero pilot who attended the conference and a bomber pilot who did not), and a lengthy collection of orders, messages, reports, and recollections bearing on the planning, execution, and aftermath of the mission. Mr. Hall, one of the panel moderators, seems more the compiler of this work than its editor, and certainly not an analyst of its materials. As a result, there is not a great deal to be said about the book as it stands. It is well designed and attractive, with useful line maps and interesting photographs; it reproduces the discussions and interviews almost too faithfully.

The symposium itself comprised two panels, "Academic" (historical and ethical) and "Mission" (who shot whom). The focus of the participants and the center of gravity of the book is plainly on the latter. It

seemed to be understood that the speakers, men who had planned or flown the attack, were there primarily to offer their recollections bearing on certain forty-five-year-old controversies: Who shot down Yamamoto? Whoever it was, did he shoot off the bomber's tail in the process? Its wing? Which one? Who "got" (and how many) Zeros? Who did Thomas Lanphier (who had publicly claimed sole credit since 1946) think he was? The editor seems to deprecate such narrowness, quoting with evident approval the great Doolittle on the fickleness of memory. Notwithstanding, such issues are implicitly the book's main concern, and those who share it will find here the materials they need.

There is much in this work, however, even for those indifferent to such matters. The old warriors themselves, unselfconscious in their self-absorption, are fascinating, and a little frightening. The highly evocative reminiscences and primary materials of this work demand engagement on their own terms, making instructive reading for some with modern, tender sensibilities.

The editor leaves us to draw our own inferences about the mission, but many leap to the eye. One is that the intercept was indeed a "million-to-one shot," as Mr. Hall calls it. To meet that moving target the sixteen aircraft flew 415 miles at fifty feet over water, guided only by the flight leader's compass, airspeed indicator, small-scale map, and wristwatch. When they made landfall, right on time, they looked up (into the sun) and saw their targets.

Also, fate seemed to conspire to make it obvious to the Japanese that the intercept "was deliberate. It was not an accident." All (mistakenly) thought this low-level tactic by normally high-altitude fighters was unprecedented and believed that all the P-38s had concentrated on the bombers (actually only the four designated "killer" aircraft did) and that these had gone straight to Yamamoto's plane (only by chance). No one missed the point, but the logical conclusion was not drawn; so many Japanese messages about the visit had been sent to so many places that it seemed unexceptional that one should go somehow astray.

The academic discussion was moderated by Dean Allard of the Naval Historical Center, and panelists included professors of history Joseph Dawson and Roger Beaumont, historian and former naval intelligence officer Roger Pineau, and professors of philosophy Paul Woodruff and Manuel Davenport. Professors Dawson's and Beaumont's examinations of the importance in battle of the person of the commander, and the effect of "decapitation," conveyed clearly the difference in "feel" of the Yamamoto case. Whereas Professor Davenport suggested only that the shootdown was wrong because it bore bitter fruit (a curiously expediential ethic), Paul Woodruff offered a useful framework that considered motivations of revenge, punishment, and "forward-looking" military effect.

If the book's primary materials are to be taken whole, the collection as a whole requires a more broadly-based assessment. It does not get one here. There are at least two areas Mr. Hall might usefully have addressed. First, it would have done everyone good simply to admit that the "Y-Mission" was an assassination, or at least acknowledge that in such a deliberate and calculated case as this the distinctions between wartime and peacetime usages now being claimed may be over-fine. The disclaimer (all involved were in uniform, in standard military aircraft) is familiar but unsatisfying, and comparison to a "special operation" seems coy.

Second, the work as a whole and at least most of its sources do not seem to take the vital "operational security" issue—the protection of an extremely sensitive intelligence source—any more seriously than had the young men on Guadalcanal, where "the whole bloody island knew" what was going on. Mr. Hall notes the damning indictment of Stewart Graham Menzies, the famous "C"; he does so only in passing, and does not take it up. This challenge by someone with an undisputed right to an opinion should have been squarely faced in a book calling itself "The Yamamoto Mission Reconsidered." There is much interesting information about wartime code-breaking, but no Ultra or Magic scholars or active intelligence practitioners were invited, and the only such authority quoted (in an appendix) skirts the point. No one—least of all the self-described "bunch of grandpas" still in their Lightnings over Bougainville, forty-five years later—seems quite to have understood, in 1943 or ever, why the British were so furious at this "act of self-indulgence."

PELHAM G. BOYER
Naval War College

Rogers, Paul P. *The Bitter Years: MacArthur and Sutherland*. New York: Praeger, 1990. 348pp. $49.95

This is the second volume of a study of the relationship between General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, during World War II. It was written by Paul P. Rogers, who was a young noncommissioned officer serving as secretary, stenographer, and office manager for the two generals in the Southwest Pacific theater. The first volume, *The Good Years: MacArthur and Sutherland*, was published early in 1990 and covered the period September 1941 to January 1943, and was reviewed herein (Winter 1992). This second volume, which appeared late in 1990, spans the era from January 1943 to September 1945.

The "good" phase refers to Sutherland's rise to power, the author's expanding role in the general headquarters, and the professional and personal harmony that characterized the MacArthur-Sutherland relationship. The "bitter" phase marks the dilemma of being caught in the middle during the collision between the two generals in military and personal affairs, and the transfer of both Sutherland

and Rogers to the United States shortly after MacArthur took command of the occupation of Japan.

Both volumes, which are actually memoirs rather than history, have similar assets and liabilities. However, *The Bitter Years* is a more poignantly moving and vivid narrative because of the tragic breakup of the two generals' friendship and Rogers' admiration for both men. Although the book is dedicated to Sutherland, Rogers is brutally frank about the chief of staff's arrogance and the extramarital affair that caused him to fall out of favor with MacArthur.

Rogers' account of Sutherland's love affair with an Australian socialite (whom he had commissioned as a WAC captain and who accompanied him from Australia to the Philippines) is most interesting, but takes up more space than it actually warrants. Rogers does discuss operations such as Operation Cartwheel, Netherlands-New Guinea, the Philippines, and Borneo, but the student of the Southwest Pacific war will wish that more attention was allotted to these.

Nevertheless, what Rogers has produced is an intimate insider's view of "GHQ" that rivals General Robert L. Eichelberger's *Dear Miss Em* as a most revealing, entertaining glimpse of the glories and follies of the senior American commanders of the conflict in the Southwest Pacific.

D. CLAYTON JAMES
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Murfett, Malcolm H. *Hostage on the Yangtze: Britain, China, and the Amethyst Crisis of 1949.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 313pp. $34.95

Rare indeed is history that is at once colorful, instructive, and relevant to the present. This work, by a leading modern British naval historian, is just such a history.

It focuses on a hundred days of crisis on the Yangtze River. On 20 April 1949, just when communist forces were about to cross the river and complete their conquest of China, British officials sent HMS *Amethyst* upriver from Shanghai to relieve HMS *Consort*, an embassy guardship at Nanking. Communist shore batteries shelled both ships, and British gunners returned fire, killing more men than they themselves lost. *Amethyst* ran aground and *Consort* fled downriver. An attempt to rescue *Amethyst* the next day ended in failure and brought death to still more Britons. Weeks of resupply efforts and negotiations for the release of *Amethyst* and its crew ensued, but when the *Amethyst*'s captain sensed that only abject capitulation to communist demands might free his ship, he plotted escape. Under cover of darkness on 30 July *Amethyst* blasted its way downriver to safety at Shanghai. Returning home, the ship and its crew were welcomed as heroes who had defended their nation's honor in the best traditon of the Royal Navy.

Malcolm Murfett has taken these facts and fashioned an adventure story that has everything (save sex) that

might be found in a novel or television drama. Violence is followed by death. Disease and hunger stalk the trapped crew. Distant officials debate what to do but prove feckless in negotiating with cunning communists. In the end there are daring triumphs, the captives are freed, and their nation rejoices.

Murfett has taken advantage of British official records and private papers and has interviewed survivors to create this richly detailed drama that no reader will want to leave until the final act has ended. This work also offers an objective lesson about naval professionalism. *Amethyst*'s crew endured the unendurable. Wounded and suffering in the torrid Chinese summer, they survived a plague of rats and a plethora of disappointments over failed efforts to secure their release. Yet there are no complaints. Lieutenant Commander John Kerans, who had been dogged by a penchant for too much wine and too many women, is transformed by adversity to become a compassionate, tough-minded, and clever hero. Drawing on both his store of navigational knowledge and his understanding of his superiors' mindset (unable to communicate with them), he correctly calculates that escape is the only hope. That subsequently he would go on to a distinguished career in naval intelligence and then to a seat in parliament is hardly surprising.

Murfett's account is relevant to the management of hostage crises today. He implies that such situations grow as much out of distant officials' ignorance as local revolutionaries' errors. For example, sending the *Amethyst* into an area that the communists and nationalists were contesting was a "curiously benighted and . . . grossly irresponsible" decision. The author suggests that *sangfroid* is the essential quality for resolving such affairs. The British ambassador had the wisdom to set aside protocol and the courage to presume (with little supporting evidence) that it was a lack of discipline among the communists rather than evil intent which caused the attack; this helped to get negotiations underway. Murfett also asserts that a government's handling of domestic politics in such situations is more important than its negotiating tactics. The British government never lost sight of its larger goal of preserving good trade and diplomatic relations with China while it sought freedom for the *Amethyst*.

Despite many strengths this work is not without its flaws. Murfett is curiously loath to reveal much history of the ships or the central characters, except in his footnotes and biographical appendices. Also, his exclusively Anglo-Chinese focus may obscure an important American element in this story: the *Amethyst* affair took place while the communists were holding another hostage, Angus Ward, the American consul-general in Mukden. It is hard to believe that either *Amethyst*'s captors or those who sought to free the ship were unaware of this grim fact. The author may also have overemphasized the value of rationality in crisis management by suggesting that Britain would have

done well to admit error and pay China an indemnity to free *Amethyst*. It is a sad fact of international life that revolutionaries are so inflamed with passion for their cause that they cannot see reason and act upon its dictates.

These points aside, *Hostage on the Yangtze* deserves to carry on its dust jacket the word that tops the British lexicon of praise: Splendid!

ROGER DINGMAN
University of Southern California

Toland, John. *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-53*. New York: William Morrow, 1991. 624pp. $25

At the conclusion of World War II, the United States underwent wholesale demobilization of its armed forces. President Truman, in opposition to the senior military and James Forrestal, drastically cut defense budgets from 1947 to 1950. At the same time, the U.S. was struggling in the early days of the containment policy with several major political and economic problems, such as the rebuilding of Europe and Japan as well as the perceived threat of communism in Eastern Europe and China.

The Korean War and its aftermath became a landmark event in reshaping the direction of U.S. political and military strategy for the coming decades. It claims many firsts: the first real test of resolve to contain the spread of communism; the first "limited" war of the modern era; the first war with a backdrop of nuclear weapons; a surrogate war (for the USSR); a United Nations coalition war; and an undeclared foreign war.

It also focused the thinking of U.S. political and military leaders about the use of force and war and the size and composition of the military. How do you conduct limited war in an alliance structure? What are the risks and gains of expanding a war? How do you define victory in a limited war? These are questions that had been asked before by theorists, but the Korean War gave them a new reality.

John Toland's splendid new popular history presents a rich panorama from the points of view of many of its heroes, villains, and survivors. Not only the first major armed conflict between communism and the West, Korea also pitted protagonists on the same side against each other: U.S. general versus U.S. general (Walker versus Almond, for example); U.S. military against U.S. press, foreshadowing things to come; and, in certainly the greatest public drama, the U.S. hero-general Douglas MacArthur against his commander in chief, Harry Truman.

There are errors enough in this book to satisfy the pickiest assistant professor of history, but Toland has presented a magnificent look at the Korean War from many vantage points and experiences. At the same time, *In Mortal Combat* upholds comprehensiveness and offers us plain good writing, with occasional wit and humor. Eighth Army commander Walton Walker's private hero was General George Patton, under whom he had served in World War II.

Walker was more subdued than Patton, of course, but according to Toland, "like his idol, he was religious but did not consider God as his personal intelligence officer."

Like most books on the Korean War, this one slights the final years of that conflict. It does chronicle the decline of domestic support, which in the Vietnam years became "the forgotten lesson of Korea."

But the most lasting domestic effect of the war, in terms of its strategic implications, was the 1952 election. Whatever chance Truman had to win, Korea finished, and his proxy Adlai Stevenson was no match for Eisenhower after the 24 October pledge—"if elected I will go to Korea." Eisenhower went, and ended the war in six months with a bit of atomic diplomacy. How important this gambit was to war termination, in comparison with Stalin's death, is still debated.

More important, after ending the war Eisenhower was determined to develop a credible strategic concept that he could implement at a fairly low cost and sell to both the American people and the nation's allies. The outcome was the New Look strategy of the 1950s, which was to have a tremendous impact at home and internationally. But that is another story.

Toland's conclusion takes us far above the scholarly realm into that of wisdom: "After writing seven histories of twentieth-century wars, I have come to a number of conclusions. It is human nature that repeats itself, not history. We often learn more about the past from the present than the reverse. I also discovered that a vile person can occasionally tell the truth and a noble person tell a lie; and that men don't make history as often as history makes men; and that the course of history is unpredictable."

Thus, Toland may have given us his swan song as a writer of history. And an eloquently truthful one it is. His book is a great read for newcomer, expert, and those of us who fought in that forgotten war.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
National Defense University

Bolger, Daniel P. *Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969* (Leavenworth Papers No. 19). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1991.

Overshadowed by Vietnam, the significant low-intensity conflict which Korea experienced in the late 1960s, resulting in hundreds of American and South Korean dead and wounded, was given little attention. This book is a reminder of those events, which Daniel Bolger refers to as the Second Korean Conflict.

Bolger discusses successful anti-infiltration tactics developed by the American commander in the field, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, and the successful grassroots defense organization instituted by the South Korean government under President Park Chung Hee. Bonesteel's tactics involved improvements to security

along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). These were not high-tech solutions but rather a series of barriers along the southern part of the zone, including observation guard posts, a reinforced chain-link barrier fence, a raked sand area with electronic sensor belt, a defoliated field of fire, minefields, and platoon defensive positions backed up by quick-reaction forces. Gradually, problems of troop alertness and morale were addressed to make these improvements effective, in spite of budget restrictions imposed by the allocation of most resources to Vietnam.

Many incidents resulting in casualties along the DMZ are discussed. Incidents treated in depth include the ill-fated raid by forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the presidential Blue House in early 1968, and the similarly ill-fated attempted sea invasion of Ulchin-Samchok in the south in late 1968. The Blue House raid nearly succeeded; the infiltrators came within eight hundred meters of the presidential residence before they were detected. Only the willingness of the South Korean military to believe the report of some woodcutters who met the commandos en route produced the increased security measures that culminated in the discovery and eradication of the would-be assassins. Within six months after this incident, President Park established the Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF), which had two million volunteers. Bolger calls this development the "single most crucial step in the Second Korean Conflict." On 30 October 1968 the HDRF was decisive in aborting the mission of 120 North Korean guerrillas who landed on the east coast of South Korea between the villages of Samchok and Ulchin. Once reported, the infiltrators had no chance to hide from the thousands of HDRF personnel. One hundred and ten North Koreans were killed and captured.

Major Bolger served as a battalion operations officer in the Republic of Korea. He earned a history doctorate at the University of Chicago, taught Soviet history at West Point, and has written three earlier books. In this work, he presents data and offers analysis in monographic form that help us understand the ongoing nature of the tension and clashes on the Korean peninsula. He has documented measures developed to counteract insurgency, measures which succeeded despite severe budget limitations.

Korea was the first great test of the Cold War, and though that war may have ended, it may yet be Korea where the final battle is fought. Bolger's book helps us to understand the need for vigilance in the Korean case, what to look for, and how to respond.

GRANT F. RHODE
Brookline, Massachusetts

Herr, Michael. *Dispatches*. New York: Vintage, 1991. 260pp. $10

This reprint from 1975 is a success as a sensationalist work, as was the film

Apocalypse Now, which Michael Herr coauthored. The vivid, disjointed, almost strident prose that is used in this personal journal attempts to capture the same emotional horror of the Vietnam War as did Hollywood using actors and special effects. The reader is simultaneously revolted, outraged, insulted, and sympathetic with those who experienced Vietnam. If one has not been exposed to this side of the Vietnam War, *Dispatches* will serve as an excellent wake-up call.

Michael Herr was twenty-eight years old, a correspondent for *Esquire*, and in a theater of war for the first time. His credentials were simply that he was there. Like other members of the press he moved from unit to unit, contact to contact, from the Demilitarized Zone to the Gulf of Thailand, always looking for the story that would set him on the front page. He quotes from all with whom he came in contact, especially those he is so fond of calling grunts. He went to some tough places and talked to the veterans and survivors of some hard-fought battles. But when it was all over Herr retired to the rear, and over alcohol and drugs (about which he writes freely) he rehashed the experiences with other correspondents, of whom his favorites were Sean Flynn, son of Errol Flynn, and Dana Stone. Perhaps it is for this reason that this work lacks continuity. There will be those who will recognize the work for what it is: random, like its comments, which are largely negative quotes from tired and disgruntled people who had no idea that their words would wind up in print.

Herr has provided a sound commentary about the enlisted men who served in combat during 1967–68: their reactions to the issues of drugs, prejudice, death, as well as the interaction between themselves and an itinerant reporter who was seeking the story that would propel him to fame. (Indeed, Herr's articles made a splash when published in *Esquire* and other magazines.)

However, Herr tends to critique many aspects of the war too harshly: all Marines were grunts, all service members used drugs, the commands were incompetent and uncaring, and there were very few people (aside from the correspondents) who were worth a damn.

Antiwar activists who read Herr's stuff loved the defeatism and the constant references to the ease of purchasing drugs and their availability to the troops. Certainly the language and the references made about politicians are believable, but the author commits a miscarriage of interpretation when he implies that one doper in one unit means that the entire unit used drugs, and that one Black Panther in one unit invalidates the lifelong bond built between service members of all races in every unit that fought in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War will live on in history as one of the most divisive and costly of wars, and because of its painful legacy we should make every effort to study it to avoid similar mistakes. After reading this book, it was obvious to this reviewer that lessons have been

learned, as was evident during Desert Storm.

However, its credibility will be best judged by those who served in Vietnam.

MOIRA FLANDERS WURZEL
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Dunham, George Ross and Quinlan, David A. *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End, 1973-1975.* Washington: Marine Corps History and Museum Division, 1991. 315pp. $25 (Available from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, D.C. 20402)

This is the seventh publication in the series by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division about the U.S. Marines in the Vietnam War. It is a well written and well illustrated work, but a sad story.

When the governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia collapsed in the wake of the communist offensive of 1974 and 1975, U.S. Marine amphibious forces from Okinawa—in particular, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade—evacuated thousands of allied and private citizens (including Americans) from the two devastated capitals of Phnom Penh and Saigon. The Marines provided for the well-being of the refugees at Subic Bay and on Guam; at the resettlement center at Camp Pendleton, California the Marines helped them to begin their new lives in the United States.

When the last evacuation helicopter touched down on the deck of the assault ship *Okinawa* on 30 April 1975, the Marine Corps' decade-long involvement appeared to have ended. However, a bizarre episode the following month found the Marines with fourteen men killed in action during the recovery of the U.S. container ship *Mayaguez*, that had been captured by Cambodian communists.

It is stated in the preface that "the South Vietnamese armed forces in the spring of 1975 were rendered useless as a fighting force by fear. No level of training or skill, no program of Vietnamization, no amount of money could have reversed the rampant spread of fear that engulfed all of South Vietnam in March and April of 1975. Incredible acts of courage temporarily checked the nation's slide into oblivion at places like Xuan Loc and Bien Hoa, but fear ruled the day. Its only antidote, courageous leadership at the highest levels, rapidly disappeared as the North Vietnamese gained momentum. As one senior leader after another opted to use his helicopter to evacuate rather than to direct and control the defensive battle, strategic retreats turned into routs and armies turned into mobs of armed deserters. Amidst all this chaos, the U.S. Marine Corps aided its country in the final chapter of the Vietnam War, the evacuation of American citizens, third-country nationals and as many South Vietnamese as conditions permitted."

The authors add in their epilogue, "Would a strategy of pacification as Marine commanders advocated early on, rather than a strategy of attrition

as followed by COMUSMACV, have made for a different outcome? Was a direct amphibious assault against North Vietnam possible without leading to a larger conflagration? Could the United States have occupied Laos and Cambodia and cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail without bringing in China? Was there a way for civilian and military policymakers to have better explained the war to the American people? Should we have gone into Vietnam in the first place?"

These are the unresolved questions about America's longest war. Farewell Vietnam. Farewell American honor.

ANTHONY WALKER
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Middletown, Rhode Island

Tilford, Earl H., Jr. *Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1991. (No price given)

The military victory of Desert Storm was hailed by many in the defense establishment, including the president, as having erased the stigma of America's defeat in Vietnam.

In the afterglow of the high tech dazzle of the Gulf war, *Setup* is an especially important work that keeps the experience of the failure of Vietnam alive so that we may learn some very unpalatable but necessary truths about the use and the limitations of force in pursuit of national political objectives.

The means have usually been determined, if not justified, by the ends. Thus, the title of this work alludes to the combination of factors operating within the service: myths, dubious doctrines, censorship, and failed vision that transformed a potentially successful outcome into doom. Given its solid Clausewitzian underpinning, the assessment could also apply in large measure to the other services, but the detailed analysis, with its extensive but not intrusive documentation, is on Air Force actions.

Earl Tilford is a retired Air Force major. His assessment of the Air Force leaves no doubt of its contribution to the Vietnam War; he asserts, however, that "air power, while occasionally pivotal, was *never* decisive." His controversial thesis holds that strategic bombing, a "dubious doctrine" at best, was necessarily irrelevant when applied to a preindustrial agricultural society. While some blame must be given to interfering politicians, most of it goes to senior Air Force leaders who "could not—indeed, did not—develop a strategy appropriate to the war at hand. In fact they failed to articulate any coherent strategy at all."

The setup that would lead to failure began in the 1950s. The Air Force grew up with and was nourished by the Eisenhower "New Look" military doctrine and its reliance on nuclear and technological superiority over the Soviet Union. Air Force doctrinal theory of strategic air power, buttressed by the experience of World War II, and the nuclear monopoly, "became increasingly technologically oriented. Strategy devolved into weaponeering. . . ." This much of his argument is supported in many other studies of U.S. strategy of the era (see

Brodie et al.); however, the author argues further that this tendency stifled thought and "Air Force official thinking became increasingly insipid." In fact, divergence from official theory became heresy and de facto censorship resulted, a point noted by Bob Woodward in *The Commanders*. Even the experience of utility of tactical interdiction and close air support demonstrated in the Korean War did not change the direction of thinking—strategic bombing was the one true faith. Thus, Vietnam found the "Air Force winging its way into Southeast Asia on a doctrine devised for bombing Nazi Germany."

Tilford undertakes an extended analysis of the various air campaigns and acknowledges the destructive interference of high-level targeting decisions. He states that the fundamental problem was political. The total devastation of North Vietnam was not a politically permissible choice for the administration, but the only sure way to end North Vietnam's support of the war in the south was to topple the Hanoi regime. In Tilford's words, the "great conundrum became how to defeat North Vietnam without defeating North Vietnam." Thus, analysis of mission execution and even the assessment of damage misses the point; "Perhaps, the bombing was not so much unsuccessful as it was irrelevant to the war in the South."

This work is a copiously documented and persuasive presentation of the case that the clash of political realities and strategic aims, not "one-hand-behind-the-back" restrictions and incremental increases in war effort, proved the deciding factors in accounting for the failure of the Air Force and air power to decide the Vietnam War. Nor could the other services alone or jointly have done any better. Given the resolve of the North Vietnamese, the nature of their war effort, and the unwillingness of the American people to support a much longer or dramatically more devastating war, it is hard to see what military action would have been appropriate or acceptable—the combination of political ends sought were simply not achievable by any military means.

As Tilford concludes, "In the end, dropping eight million tons of bombs was no substitute for a coherent strategy." *Setup* is an essential contribution to the study of our longest war.

MICHAEL CORGAN
Naval War College

Coakley, Thomas P., ed. *C³I: Issues of Command and Control*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1991. 408pp. (No price given) (Available from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, D.C. 20402).

This compilation is an intriguing addition to the record of national security decision making during the 1980s. A combined effort of the National Defense University and Harvard's Program on Information Resources Policy has produced a well edited, annotated, and indexed

collection of excerpts from Harvard's annual seminars on C^3I issues.

Former and current senior government officials convened in Cam-bridge, Massachusetts, each year to offer unclassified presentations about the different aspects of national C^3I policy.

Thomas Coakley, professor of English at the Air Force Academy, has distilled the thirteen hundred pages of their seminar transcripts into a fascinating read—no mean feat given common perceptions of the topic. The various discussions have been divided into five broad areas and chronologically woven together to form a surprisingly coherent whole. Dispensing with conventional notes, he has inserted helpful "informational cut-ins" that not only tell the reader who was who but also serve as a good refresher to the not-so-distant events, such as Grenada, Beirut, and *Mayaguez*, that often come up in discussion. The Goldwater-Nichols Act may seem a bit dated, but most issues covered are still with us.

The years included are from 1980 to 1987, encompassing the last year of the Carter administration and most of the Reagan era. Given the seniority of both the military and civilian participants, these presentations offer an unusually frank discussion of the many crises of the 1980s and earlier. Although these lectures were recorded when the Soviet Union was the primary threat, the reader is struck by how many C^3I crises actually revolved around terrorism, and low-intensity and regional conflicts.

This work is a fascinating testimony of the senior level civilians and military officers who received and transmitted White House strategy and policy during a pivotal decade, and it depicts a variety of inside views of national security decision making from those very close to the top—an unvarnished "inside the Beltway" story. Accordingly, the operational military officer will not find much of immediate practical application here. However, anyone who is interested in how the National Command Authority actually operates, especially during a crisis, will find it useful reading.

STEVEN E. BROUGHALL, JR.
Major, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Broad, William J. *Teller's War.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. 350pp. $25

To many on both sides of the political arena, Edward Teller personifies the role of scientists and science in making defense policy in the nuclear age. Present at the creation of that age, Teller rode its crest through to the collapse of the Soviet military.

Yet not a single weapon which he helped to create played a vital role or was ever used against its intended enemy. Some were serious failures—including two generations of H-bombs and the X-ray laser for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). How then does one explain his continued influence on American nuclear defense policy and strategy?

William Broad, a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner for scientific reporting for *The New York Times*, wisely

does not try to answer that question. Rather, he focuses on Teller's role in the X-ray laser debacle, the centerpiece of the SDI program.

Broad holds the view that Edward Teller misled the American public and its government with unwarranted optimism about the likelihood of SDI performing as advertised. This is a pretty serious accusation, which Broad supports with interviews of the many key scientists, engineers, managers, and policymakers involved in the development of the X-ray laser. The author appears to have digested the entire public record on SDI. However, he did not speak directly to Edward Teller.

Broad discusses two themes: first, the personality of Edward Teller, who is proud, brilliant, imaginative, politically astute, shunned by many of his technical peers, and fiercely anticommunist; second, the vision and promise offered by SDI, the invisible yet impenetrable shield over America through which no nuclear weapon might ever pass. The gumbo is the reality of physics and engineering, and the politics of science and government.

It is a credit to Broad that he has made of this esoterica the stuff of high drama. One would have to go back to Tizard and Lindemann (in C.P. Snow's *Science and Government*) to find a similarly powerful story of antagonistic personalities, technical visions, and their consequences for national defense.

Teller's vision of defense against a nuclear attack featured an X-ray laser-driven SDI defense with thousands of high-energy beams zinging unerringly across space to zap the Soviet nuclear warheads *before* they could reenter the atmosphere and detonate. He persisted in this vision even as initial X-ray laser tests showed questionable and eventually failing results—even when significant scientific personalities and institutions cast first private and then public doubt on the technological prospects.

Why? Teller is neither a political nor a technological fool. But on this point Broad doesn't quite hit the mark. Perhaps Teller is too complex a personality for Broad's journalistic approach. Teller's own explanation is that he "was guilty of over optimism." Perhaps this is not a sin in the scientific community, but over optimism is a dangerous basis for expensive public policy.

Another question is, why did the White House, Congress, and the American public support SDI? I believe Broad does hit the mark on this. The public was ready for a major shift in nuclear defense strategy, and the promise of an impenetrable shield over the land was brilliantly conveyed by Ronald Reagan. SDI appeared to offer the promise of a nuclear defense strategy based on real defense rather than the ghastly promise of mutual assured destruction. That this vision was backed, endorsed, and apparently guaranteed by Edward Teller put the cap to it. If the Father of the H-Bomb believed that the time had come to rely on a nuclear-pumped laser shield, who were we to doubt that it would work, and in only a decade or so at that?

So with very little public debate, a massive shift in strategy for nuclear

defense began. Huge amounts of money were made available to the SDI project. The best and the brightest of the physics community in the United States and some allied countries were mobilized and set to it.

As each critical X-ray laser test proved less promising, wrenching debates about the physics of SDI racked the laboratories. The titanic intellectual battles tore apart the physics community—careers, marriages, and friendships were destroyed. Even as the tests were failing, new and more elaborate promises were made by Teller and the true believers of SDI at the Livermore Laboratory.

Very little of this made its way into the public realm. The most demanding critiques of the X-ray laser came from within the nuclear weapons community. Eventually, the program failed, and funding was drastically reduced to barely enough to keep the project alive. The current thinking is that perhaps in fifty years we will see an X-ray laser.

However, Edward Teller survived the implosion of his vision. Indeed, the budget demands called for a reduced program to defend only a few critical sites from random, isolated attacks, not with X-ray lasers but with Smart Pebbles, yet another vision of Teller and the Livermore Laboratory.

Broad accuses Teller of deception, but is this the point? Rather, shouldn't we ask what is the proper role for optimistic high technology when making defense policy? Clearly the science is needed, and clearly there have been cases, such as SDI and the bomber before World War II, when the technology has not lived up to its promise.

Ultimately, the value of Broad's work lies not in the question of Teller's veracity or mendacity but in its study of the relationship between the promises of science and of high technology and the making of national security strategy and policy.

William Broad's work, like that of C.P. Snow, should be read by those who would engage in defense or public policy making based on the promises of exotic physics. Great scientists, like administrators and policy makers, are not without the potential for self-deception.

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Amundsen, Kirsten. *Soviet Strategic Interests in the North.* New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 153pp. $45

Bland, Douglas L. *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy.* New York: Praeger, 1991. 288pp. $47.95

Drew, S. Nelson et al. *The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment.* New York: Praeger, 1991. 224pp. $42.95

Skorve, Johnny. *The Kola Satellite Image Atlas: Perspectives on Arms Control and Environmental Protection.* Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1991. 130pp. $29.50

Just as those who live in the far north listen carefully during the spring thaw for the first rumblings that portend the breakup of the winter ice, so too do Americans listen carefully in the

political thaw for the rumblings that might portend the breakup of the Nato Alliance.

One has only to scan the international press to feel the building pressure. Even as Nato shifts its strategic focus away from the old unidirectional threat to the more unfocused risks in an unstable world, Europeans are questioning Nato's role and relevance. Plans for a European-only defense have been discussed in the European Community, the Western European Union, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Although the heads of all European Nato nations have publicly pledged their support to the organization, the future of Nato is by no means certain. The public debate is noisy and its intensity will only increase in the coming months and years.

In such a climate the appearance of new books about Nato can have unusual influence. Each of those under review is a well written exposition of one aspect of the debate over the future of Nato. However, the influence each might have on the debate varies significantly.

Soviet Strategic Interests in the North and *The Kola Satellite Image Atlas* might have less influence than the others. These provide what can best be called the classic Norwegian view of the Russian threat. Conditioned by decades of Soviet hostility, the books are an expression of the continuing Norwegian concern with the threat from the East. *Soviet Strategic Interests* was written before the breakup of the Soviet Union and, thus, focuses on 1990 Soviet foreign policy and military activity. Because of this, the casual American reader might be tempted to regard the book as an anachronism and ignore it. That would be a mistake. Despite the dated appearance of her material, Dr. Amundsen's effort reflects a wide body of current Norwegian public opinion. Recent Norwegian polls indicate that even though the Soviet Union no longer exists, a large majority still view Russia as potentially a major threat. Going distinctly against the grain of public opinion in other Western nations, over sixty percent of Norwegians believe their defense budget should remain the same or even be increased.

Against this background Dr. Amundsen's analysis takes on new meaning. The key question she raises is, why, in the face of the clear change in Soviet policy toward the West, the Soviets (now Russians) still maintain and improve their formidable military posture vis-à-vis the small Scandinavian countries. Her detailed review of the strategic importance of the northern region and the difficult history of Soviet-Scandinavian relations gives the reader a better appreciation of why the Norwegians continue to view Russia with concern. By showing how the expanding (Russian) military presence on the Kola peninsula looks through Norwegian eyes, *Soviet Strategic Interests* provides a useful counterpoint to the more benign view of the Russians taken by the mainstream of European thinking.

Though non-Scandinavian readers might consider Dr. Amundsen's analysis myopic, they might do well to pick up *The Kola Satellite Atlas* next. Although not associated with Dr. Amundsen, the *Atlas* dramatically underscores her basic points. Using surprisingly detailed imagery available from commercial satellites (SPOT-P and LANDSAT-TM), the *Atlas* documents the increased number of military installations on the Kola Peninsula. With forty-three satellite images juxtaposed with explanatory maps and detailed analyses for each image, the reader is given a sobering view of the Russian military installations in this strategic bastion. For those without access to military satellite imagery or not familiar with the work of a photo interpreter, the *Atlas* is a fascinating glimpse into the field.

As with *Soviet Strategic Interests*, *The Future of NATO* appears dated when reviewing it in 1992. Written by senior U.S. military officers serving as National Security Fellows at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and based on research conducted in 1989-90, the book provides a thoughtful option for a revised Nato military strategy. Originally published in April 1992, during the period when Nato was developing its new strategy, *The Future of NATO* provided a distinct alternative to the alliance's military strategy of flexible response.

Starting from the premise that pressures for reduced defense spending would result in smaller forces available to meet the residual Soviet threat, the authors proposed a more efficient conventional arms defensive strategy. Termed "resilient defense," the strategy was a carefully crafted attempt to replace large numbers of troops on the ground by capitalizing on existing mobilization capabilities.

Unfortunately, although both the strategy and the book are well thought out, events of the past several years have passed them by. The debate within Nato over a new strategy, which the book attempted to advance, took a completely different path. Nato's strategic review concluded that because future risks to alliance nations were multidirectional, multifaceted, and much less clearly defined than previously, it could open contacts with its former adversaries and make its operations more transparent to the opposition. The new strategy is now an unclassified, public document that focuses on crisis management and conflict prevention through a combination of political, economic, and miltary measures.

Despite this, *The Future of NATO* remains a book worth reading. Should the need arise, this book provides one possible military strategy by which the U.S. and Nato can increase their defensive posture on the ground in Europe while accommodating what are certain to be continued pressures for reduced defense spending.

In contrast to the above books, *The Military Committee* could have unusual significance. Focusing on the key, but surprisingly little-analyzed, committee of the chiefs of staff of most member nations, the book is both a thoroughly researched history of the organization and a thoughtful analysis

of the group's powerful role in the Nato policy process.

Writing from the perspective of one who has observed the organization at close quarters, Bland details the historical antecedents of the committee, how the present structure was developed, and how it has used its influence within the alliance. By itself, this historical analysis fills an important gap in literature about Nato. What gives the book its potential influence in the current debate, however, is the final chapter, in which Bland draws together the threads of structure and policy to postulate a seminal change in the structure of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Fully cognizant of and drawing upon the serious proposals that have been made within the debate over the relevance and future role of Nato in European defense, Bland concludes that a structure for European security cooperation is likely to be possible only within the Atlantic alliance. To avoid splitting the alliance along national or political lines, he suggests forming a regional military structure to support a reinforcement strategy. Allied Command Europe would be abolished and Nato's military forces organized into five major Nato commands: Atlantic Command, Northern European Command, Central European Command, Southern European Command, and Strategic Reserve Command. With appropriate nations grouped into relevant major Nato commands, the need for the post of SacEur (to this point always an American) would dissolve and the post could be abolished. In such a radical realignment the Military Committee would assume a much more prominent role.

The Military Committee is an important book which deserves careful study by all who participate in the debate over the future of Nato. Although Nato is restructuring itself along less radical lines at the moment, unless the alliance is willing, as Bland points out, to look carefully at its basic structure, the essential political cohesion of the decades-old alliance could be in jeopardy.

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Hiden, John and Salmon, Patrick. *The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Longman, 1991. 224pp. (No price given)

During the profound transformation of political and economic relationships in Europe, a reexamination of the relative significance of peripheral and border areas is in order. At such times, the catalyst for dramatic developments has often appeared on the margins of the European state system. Given the conditions of uncertainty and erosion of long-standing security arrangements, even diminutive states and nonstate actors may momentarily play roles far out of proportion to their relative standing in the international community. Thus, the march of fundamental change

occurring in Europe—German reunification, the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union, and transformation of former East Bloc states—demands a reassessment of these "marginal" areas in order to identify emerging trends with the potential to influence the broader security environment.

At least four regions around the periphery of the erstwhile Soviet empire warrant fresh examination: the Russian Far East, Soviet Central Asia, the Balkans, and that region which Roman Szporluk has recently recast with the appellation, "Far-Eastern Europe." The book under review contributes enormously to a reassessment of the evolving role of the standard bearers in the latter region—the newly independent Baltic states.

While there are many specialized studies of Baltic history and of Soviet policy toward these nations, few have focused on the broader implications of independent Baltic States operating in a transformed Europe. Furthermore, an understanding of the history of their status under international law is essential. The Baltic independence movements drew heavily from that source for political leverage in their dialogue with the Soviet center and as a source of legitimacy on the world stage. Hiden and Salmon are particularly well situated to place recent events in the context of historical and diplomatic perspectives because of their previous research and their ability to draw upon the resources of the Baltic Research Unit at Bradford University. They have produced a remarkably balanced presentation of the critical variables and lessons of Baltic historical experience and have illuminated the meaning of the experience in the present context.

These lessons center around a number of key observations. First is the assertion that the experience of independence and state-building between 1920 and 1940 remains relevant in contemporary terms and differentiates these states from other republics of the former Soviet Union. The authors highlight the striking parallels between the domestic and international situation obtaining in the early 1920s and today. Second, they reconsider the timely issues of whether small states are viable and how they function within the European political system. They argue that on the basis of reasonably successful efforts at state-building and trade development during the first independence period, the Baltic states of today can make it politically and economically. Third, they make a strong case that full restoration of sovereignty and the end of the Cold War are essential preconditions for attainment of real security, economic prosperity, and resumption of the role of the Baltic states as a bridge between East and West.

While exploring these themes, the authors prove especially adept at highlighting salient factors which are sometimes overlooked. For example, they are careful to delineate how the geographic, religious, political, and economic divisions between Lithuania and Latvia-Estonia gave rise to very different approaches to the independence drive and state-building.

The book suffers only from the unavoidable problem of having gone to press before the final act in the process of achieving independence had played out. The discussion ends with a postscript appended in the wake of Gorbachev's spasmodic attempt in January 1991 to restore by force central authority and control in the Baltics. Information available after this period could have fleshed out the means by which "Green" politics provided a vital basis for the rebirth of Baltic nationalism, the different approaches to the minority rights issue, the disruption of the Baltic economies through withholding of energy resources and rerouting of transit trade, and the dramatic erosion of Soviet-CIS military power in the region. Despite these subsequent developments, the authors managed to forecast trends with a high degree of success.

Hiden and Salmon have provided a foundation for addressing the critical question—as important now as in the past—of what role the Baltic states will play in a changing environment: forward outpost of German influence and dominance, Russia's window on the West, a reconstituted buffer zone, or mediator and bridge between East and West. They remind us of the potential to overlook, while fixating on developments in the CIS, the distinctive role of the Baltic states. As a guide to the relevant issues, this concise and authoritative synthesis is strongly recommended.

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Sokolsky, Joel, J. *The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform: Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy and Allied Naval Cooperation.* Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1991. 77pp. $7.50 (available from Naval War College Foundation Gift Shop, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I. 02841-1207)

This eighth volume in the Naval War College Historical Monograph Series covers the career of Richard Geary Colbert, the thirty-first president of the College. The author has traced and ably discussed Colbert's assignments from 1948 to 1973 that were directly concerned with international affairs.

Beginning with the assignment in 1948 as flag lieutenant and aide to Admiral Richard Connelly, commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, each tour described contributed to Colbert's understanding of United States maritime strategy and the need for closer cooperation with allied and other free-world navies. During his subsequent tours of duty in the Navy's "state department" (the international affairs division of Naval Operations (Op-35)), Colbert worked on a variety of problems under the direction of Rear Admiral Bernard Austin, and then indirectly for Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke.

In 1956, the recently promoted Captain Colbert was a student in "Naval Warfare 1" at the Naval War College, and had been selected to remain for the next academic year as a student in "Naval Warfare 2." Earlier, while in Washington, Colbert had

written a brief staff study recommending a course for international students at the Naval War College. Colbert undertook to organize, guide, and instruct a most diverse group of officers. His years in Newport had provided him with an excellent background for his presidency in 1968 as a relatively junior rear admiral, at the age of fifty-three.

Because of his background in international affairs and maritime strategy, Colbert was promoted to admiral in 1972 and was assigned as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe. He had only begun to tackle the various problems in the Mediterranean when illness forced him into retirement.

Joel Sokolsky, a senior fellow at the Queen's Centre for International Relations in Canada and a professor of political science at the Royal Miltary College, has concentrated in this work on the last twenty-five years of Admiral Colbert's life.

However, omitted by the author are Colbert's tours of sea duty during the Cold War, such as his time as executive officer of the cruiser *Albany*; as commanding officer of the storeship *Altair*; and commanding officer of the guided missile cruiser *Boston*. Most of these tours were spent in the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean; also, in 1951 while in Op-35, Colbert accompanied Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, during negotiations with General Franco for Spanish bases. His first-hand knowledge of these negotiations and his international exercises with the Sixth Fleet during his command tours gave him experience in combined naval operations.

Joel Sokolsky has put together a worthwhile and useful addition to naval history in this account of a twentieth-century senior officer working steadily to make stronger the fraternity of the blue uniform.

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Cogar, William B. *Dictionary of Admirals of the U.S. Navy, 1901-1918.* Vol. II. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 319pp. (No price given)

Just two years ago, the Naval Institute Press published the first volume of this valuable reference work. (Reviewed in *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1992.) Identical in format to its predecessor, this new volume is an illustrated, alphabetical listing of the 330 American naval officers who reached flag rank during the first eighteen years of this century. It covers less than half as many years as volume one but is one hundred pages longer, adding 120 more admirals in this shorter period.

Wherever possible, Cogar presents a photograph of the individual, along with a brief note about his parents, a chronology of the officer's service appointments and highlights of his career, the present location of his personal papers, a bibliography of published writings, and a list of main writings about him. Thus, one has a reference that can serve a variety of research needs.

Among the names in this volume, one finds such well known figures as Mahan, Sims, Fiske, and Robley Evans. There is also an unexpected name, that of the famous Engineer-in-Chief, B.F. Isherwood. Since he retired from active service in 1884, one would expect to have found him in volume one; yet Cogar quite correctly lists him here since he did not receive the rank of rear admiral until 1906. Others in the list are not so well known, and some have been totally overlooked in modern memory.

Cogar's work in these volumes makes fertile ground for a detailed analysis of the broad social and professional characteristics of the American flag officer. A quick look through these pages reveals information that can be both interesting and surprising. For example, nearly thirty percent of the admirals listed in this volume were published authors. Fourteen were foreign born: five came from Germany; three came from England and Canada; while Norway, Ireland, and the Bahamas can each claim an American admiral in those years. Another, Thomas Stevens, was the son of a rear admiral and a third-generation American naval officer but was born in the independent Kingdom of Hawaii.

Others had similarly interesting family backgrounds. Here we find the representatives in this period of some of the great American naval families, as well as forebears of later famous names: Badger, Griffin, Fechteler, Fletcher, Moore, Ingersoll, Osterhaus, Rodgers, Taussig, Wadleigh and Winslow. James Kane was one of the three born in Canada and the son of Captain Clement Kane, Royal Navy. Others came from widely scattered backgrounds. One was the son of the explorer and territorial governor, John C. Fremont. Eugene Leutze's father was the famous German artist, Emmanuel Leutze, who painted such historical subjects as "Washington Crossing the Delaware," "Columbus in Chains," and the fresco in the Capitol building, "Westward the Star of Empire Takes Its Way."

In contrast to the first volume, one can see here the growing standardization of officer education through the Naval Academy and the Naval War College, yet we do find the name of Oscar Farenholt, the first man to begin his naval career as an enlisted man and reach flag rank without attending the Naval Academy. Both Nehemiah Dyer and James Forsyth served before the mast in merchant ships before volunteering for the Navy. Equally interesting, one can also see the wide-ranging backgrounds amongst those who became flag officers in the staff corps. A number of them had extensive educations in civilian universities. Here we find that many of the medical officers were trained at Columbia. Cary Grayson, President Wilson's White House physician, studied at William and Mary and received his medical degree from the University of the South at Sewanee. Aaron Ward, the son of a U.S. Army general, had his early education in Germany and in

Paris before attending the Naval Academy. One of the most distinguished names in American naval science, David Taylor, graduated from Randolph-Macon University before attending the Naval Academy and the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. A lesser-known figure in naval astronomy, John Eastman, received both his master's and a doctorate from Dartmouth in the 1860s and 1870s. James Gill, the Navy's first chaplain to reach flag rank, received A.B., A.M., B.D. and D.D. degrees from Bucknell, and Robert Peary, engineer and arctic explorer, took his civil engineering degree at Bowdoin. Another, Charles Parks, studied at Rensselaer Polytechnic, and Gottingen University in Germany, and headed the department of physics at Rensselaer before joining the Navy as a civil engineer in 1897.

Without diminishing the achievement and great value of this reference work, one can hope that greater attention might be paid in future volumes to medals and decorations, particularly from foreign governments. Such entries as that for Henry Mayo are not very helpful: "Awarded Distinguished Service Medal and a few foreign medals." In addition, it would be particularly useful to have a list of officers' seniority by dates of flag rank, and also an index to Naval Academy classes, duty stations, colleges and universities, connections with foreign countries, family members with different surnames, battles, subjects of published writings, birth and death places, medals and decorations, and other items not readily found through the main entry.

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